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The global geography of poverty has changed over the last two 
decades. More than 70 percent of the world’s poor at US$1.25 
a day now live not in low-income countries, but in middle-in-
come countries (Kanbur and Sumner 2011). This raises a 
number of big questions. Is economic growth not sufficient to 
pull everybody out of poverty? Can middle-income countries 
or parts thereof suffer from poverty traps? If so, then what 
can one do to promote shared prosperity? This note examines 
these questions in detail, using both a national and a subna-
tional lens, and in a global setting, drawing on the recent 
World Bank report, The Poor Half Billion in South Asia (Ghani 
2010). 
The geography of poverty has changed. More than 70 percent of the world’s poor live not in low-income countries, but in 
middle-income countries. In 2008, nearly 570 million people lived on less than US$1.25 a day in South Asia, compared 
to 385 million in sub-Saharan Africa. In addition, nearly 70 percent of the poor people in South Asia live in the lagging 
regions. Improving the living standards of these regions is crucial to achieving the goal of shared prosperity. Economic 
growth is not sufficient to enable the lagging regions of South Asia to catch up with the leading regions, in terms of 
proportional reductions in poverty rates. Policies must be specifically targeted toward achieving greater growth and 
poverty reduction in these regions. One particular policy channel to achieve shared prosperity is pro-poor fiscal transfers. 
For the most part, interstate fiscal transfers in South Asian countries do promote equity through transfer of resources to 
poorer regions, but this outcome usually occurs when pro-poor redistribution has explicit rules and transparency. Further, 
simply directing financial resources to lagging regions may not be sufficient, and may need to be complemented with 
increases in capacity, transparency, and participation to facilitate accountability at the local level. 
Poverty is the worst form of violence.
—Mahatma Gandhi
Where Do the Poor Live? 
Most of the poor people in India and other South Asian coun-
tries live in the lagging regions (states with per capita income 
below the national average). Figure 1 shows that poverty mass 
(or the number of poor people) is largely concentrated in the 
lagging states. Leading states (with per capita income above 
the national average) have poor people too, but rapid econom-
ic growth has helped them to manage poverty better. Nearly 
70 percent of the poor people in India and South Asia live in 
the lagging regions, so improving the living standards of these 
regions is crucial to achieving the goal of shared prosperity.
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gions. This can be achieved by improving the business envi-
ronment for the private sector, supporting market integration, 
improving connectivity, and ensuring macroeconomic stabil-
ity. The government can also intervene directly in sectors or 
locations in which the private sector is reluctant to invest.
Another strategy is to promote pro-poor fiscal transfers 
and devolve power to local governments who may then imple-
ment policies more suited to local conditions. The second 
One way to achieve shared prosperity is through econom-
ic growth. The first part of this note shows that current pat-
terns of economic growth do not appear to be enough. Lag-
ging regions have slower growth than leading ones. While 
there is poverty reduction in both leading and lagging regions, 
lagging regions do not display greater poverty reduction in 
proportional terms. Policies should therefore aim to acceler-
ate the growth rate and poverty reduction of the lagging re-
Source: Reprinted from The Poor Half Billion in South Asia—What Is Holding Back Lagging Regions?
Note: Lagging and leading states: in most developing and industrial countries, lagging regions are defined as those areas where growth and income seriously lag behind average 
national peformance. In this map, a state is defined as lagging if its per capita income is below the national average.
Leading
Areas
Lagging
Areas
Low Poverty Mass
High Poverty Mass*
No Data
INDIA
BHUTAN
BANGLADESH
AFGHANISTAN
MYANMAR
SRI LANKA
MALDIVES
PAKISTAN
NEPAL
Northern
North Central
Eastern
Central
Uva
Southern
Western
North Western
Sabaragamuwa
Mizoram
Tripura
Manipur
Nagaland
Arunachal
Pradesh
Assam
Meghalaya
Sikkim
Tamil
NaduKerala
Karnataka
Goa
Andhra
Pradesh
Maharashtra
Andaman and
Nicobar
Orissa
Chhattisgarh
Madhya PradeshGujarat
Rajasthan Uttar Pradesh
Bihar
Jharkhand West
Bengal
Delhi
Uttarakhand
Haryana
Punjab
Eastern
Central
WesternMid
Western
Far
Western
Sindh
Balochistan
Punjab
Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa
Khulna
Barisal
Dhaka
SylhetRajshahi
¯
* High poverty mass is defined 
as subnational areas of a 
country having a large poor 
population. In Bangladesh, high 
poverty mass is > 15 million 
persons; in India and Pakistan,  
> 20 million persons; in Nepal,  
> 1.5 million persons; and in Sri 
Lanka, > 0.6 million persons. 
Poverty Mass
is Concentrated
in Lagging Regions
Not : Lagging and leading states: I  most developing and industrial countries, lagging regions are defined as those areas where growth 
and income seriously lag behind average national peformance. In this map, a state is defined as lagging if its per capita income is below 
the national average. 
Figure 1. Poverty Mass Concentration in India
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part of this note examines whether the current fiscal decen-
tralization programs are working to the benefit of the poor 
regions in South Asia. 
Poverty Convergence across Countries  
and Regions 
Poverty itself can become a constraint to growth through 
channels such as lower savings or investment rates; dismal 
education or health outcomes; poor access to credit or prop-
erty rights; incomplete insurance markets, which increase the 
risks of crop failures, floods, and droughts; and high conflict 
rates. Such “poverty traps” limit the choices of economic 
agents, whether individuals, households or firms, to fully ex-
press their economic potential. These traps can start a vicious 
cycle, with no income growth feeding into greater poverty, 
which in turn reduces growth even further. 
So, does evidence show that countries suffer from pover-
ty traps? Not really. Figure 2 shows that countries with ini-
tially higher levels of poverty experienced greater absolute re-
ductions in the poverty headcount ratio—the proportion of 
the population living below the international poverty line of 
US$1.25 a day. 
These trends are further verified in regressions report-
ed in table 1 and found to be statistically significant (table 
1, column 1). If the absolute change in the headcount ratio 
is regressed on the initial poverty level, it shows a negative 
and statistically significant coefficient, even after control-
ling for growth rates of per capita gross domestic product 
(GDP). 
Indicator
Annualized changes in headcount ratio
Annualized change in  
poverty gap
Annualized change in poverty 
gap squared
Absolute Proportional Absolute Proportional Absolute Proportional
1
Initial poverty 
> 10%
2 3 4 5 6 7
Initial poverty 
(level)
-0.02***
(0.005)
-0.02***
(0.010)
Initial poverty (log) -0.006
(0.01)
Initial poverty gap 
(level)
-0.046***
(0.006)
Initial poverty gap 
(log)
-0.024***
(0.013)
Initial poverty gap 
squared (level)
-0.05***
(0.006
Initial poverty gap 
squared (log)
-0.045***
(0.015)
Growth rate of GDP 
per capita
-0.25**
(0.12)
-0.31**
(0.15)
-0.01***
(0.004)
-0.104*
(0.061)
-0.01***
(0.007)
-0.05
(0.037)
-0.022**
(0.009)
Observations 82 56 82 82 82 79 79
R-squared 0.97 0.32 0.13 0.48 0.21 0.60 0.37
Source: World Bank 2009b, 2009c.
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** represents significance at 1 percent, ** represents significance at 5 percent, * represents significance at 10 
percent. Poverty rate is defined as percentage of population living in households with consumption or income per person below the international US$1.25 poverty line. Annualized 
poverty change is for 1977–2007. Poverty gap is defined as the mean distance below the poverty line as a proportion of the poverty line. Squared poverty gap is defined as mean 
of the squared distances below the poverty line as a proportion of the poverty line. 
Table 1. Poverty Convergence across Countries
Figure 2. Convergence in Poverty Headcount Ratios (absolute 
level)
Source: World Bank 2009b.
Notes: Poverty rate is for US$1.25. Time period for change in poverty is for 
1977–2007. Number of observations is 91.
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Using the reduction in headcount ratio is obviously an 
important way to measure economic progress. But there are 
two issues with using this measure. First, countries with low 
levels of poverty cannot display high values of poverty reduc-
tion. The existence of a “floor value” of zero therefore may not 
capture all the progress in a country starting from low levels 
of poverty. 
One can partially control for the existence of such a floor 
value by restricting the sample to countries that had a head-
count poverty ratio greater than 10 percent in the initial pe-
riod. The results regarding convergence are robust to this re-
striction (table 1, column 2). These results provide a basis for 
cautious optimism regarding progress in poor countries; poor 
countries may not be trapped in poverty forever.
The second caveat to using absolute poverty change is the 
fact that reducing poverty from a high level might be easier 
than reducing poverty from an already low level. The latter 
might reflect more entrenched factors leading to poverty, in-
cluding low levels of education or health problems or even 
persistent beliefs about the value of effort (for example, 12–
13 percent of the U.S. population has been under the national 
poverty line for more than a decade). Using a percentage 
change in poverty (or equivalently, a change in log poverty) 
gives a greater magnitude to poverty reductions starting from 
a low base. It also avoids the floor value problem.
When one considers percentage changes in poverty, there 
is no longer any significant degree of convergence in poverty 
across countries (table 1, column 3). In other words, although 
poorer countries do reduce absolute numbers of people living 
in poverty, they do not reduce them proportionally faster 
than richer countries. This fact has also been documented in 
Ravallion (2012), who ascribes the lack of convergence to two 
reasons. The first is that initially poor countries do not grow as 
fast as not-so-poor countries, and the second is that, for a giv-
en rate of growth, poverty reduction in proportional terms 
appears to be slower in poorer countries.
In addition to the headcount ratio, other measures of 
poverty that take into account how far households are from 
the poverty line can also be examined. This is particularly im-
portant in measuring extreme poverty, which may not be re-
flected fully in a simple comparison of headcount ratios. The 
two measures to consider are the Poverty Gap (PG) Index and 
the Squared Poverty Gap (SPG) Index—where the poverty gap 
is the average distance of an individual from the poverty line 
(with those above having a gap of zero).
Regressions using the PG or SPG measures show strong 
evidence of convergence across countries, with poorer coun-
tries showing the largest reductions in these indices—both for 
absolute reductions as well as proportional ones. This result is 
encouraging. Even if poorer countries are not able to achieve 
huge reductions in the headcount ratio, they do appear to 
show the largest reductions in the depth and severity of pov-
erty (table 1, columns 4–7). Although the poorest show the 
largest increases in consumption, they are so far from the pov-
erty line that this progress does not show up in equivalent 
changes to the headcount ratio.
Poverty Convergence in South Asia 
At the subnational level, examining poverty convergence/di-
vergence shows that trends within India and across South 
Asian regions are similar to the earlier results for the global 
sample. At the subnational level, states with higher levels of 
poverty experienced greater absolute reductions in the head-
count ratio (table 2, columns 1 and 2). As in the global sample, 
however, they did not experience greater proportional reduc-
tions in the headcount ratio (table 2, columns 3 and 4), sug-
gesting that more needs to be done in the lagging regions to 
align them with the leading ones. When looking at measures 
of poverty depth and severity, once again the initially worse-off 
regions showed greater improvements in these measures than 
the initially better-off regions (table 2, columns 5 and 7).
Unlike the global sample, however, the lagging regions in 
India do not show proportionally better performance in re-
ducing the PG or the SPG measures (table 2, columns 6 and 
8). This is a worrisome sign that poverty reduction in the lag-
ging regions of India and South Asia needs to be accelerated, 
especially with regard to extreme poverty.
Overall, these results provide for cautious optimism on 
shared prosperity and progress in the lagging regions. There is 
little evidence of persistent poverty traps at a regional level in 
South Asia, or even among developing countries as a whole. 
However, there is also no room for complacency. Lagging re-
gions are not catching up with the leading regions in terms of 
per capita income or in health indicators, or even in propor-
tionate terms for poverty reduction. 
As discussed earlier, one solution is to implement poli-
cies to accelerate growth in the lagging regions. Another is to 
redistribute resources across regions in an effort to improve 
living standards. The next section reviews fiscal decentraliza-
tion arrangements in South Asia and examines whether these 
result in greater transfers to the lagging regions.
Fiscal Decentralization Arrangements in 
South Asia 
A typical cross-country measure of fiscal decentralization is 
the share of total revenues or expenditures that are collected 
by subnational governments. India is quite decentralized 
compared with the world average: subnational (state and lo-
cal) governments collect 34 percent of all government reve-
nues and are in charge of 52 percent of total government ex-
penditures (table 3).
Like many large federal nations, states in India receive 
transfers from the central government through a variety of 
mechanisms. The first consists of tax shares and grants decided 
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by a nonpolitical Finance Commission, which places weights 
on factors such as the state’s area (10 percent), population (25 
percent), per capita income (50 percent), and other factors in-
cluding the state’s own revenues as a fraction of state domestic 
product (7.5 percent).1 The second source of funding is from 
the Planning Commission, which is in charge of formulating 
national five-year plans and makes grants and loans for imple-
menting state development plans. The Planning Commission 
takes into account the state population and the gap between 
state per capita income and the national average, among other 
factors, when deciding state-level allocations. Third, various 
central government ministries give grants to their counterparts 
in the states for specified projects either wholly funded by the 
center (central sector projects) or requiring the states to share a 
proportion of the cost (centrally sponsored 
schemes). These grants are wholly discretion-
ary and often are not coordinated with Plan-
ning Commission transfers, although they are 
meant to serve similar objectives.
In addition to these explicit transfers 
from the central government to the states, a 
number of “hidden” or “implicit” transfers 
arise from the large subsidies provided by the 
central government for food and fertilizer. In 
2007–8, the central government had bud-
geted about 1.34 percent of overall GDP to be 
paid out in subsidies, the bulk of which paid 
for subsidized food sales through the Food 
Corporation of India, and for fertilizers. Ad-
ditionally, subsidized borrowing resources for 
the states are provided by either the central 
government or government-owned financial 
Indicator
Annualized change in 
headcount ratio  
(absolute)
Annualized change in 
headcount ratio  
(proportional)
Annualized change in 
poverty gap
Annualized change in 
poverty gap squared
South Asia India South Asia India
India, 
absolute
India, 
proportional
India, 
absolute
India, 
proportional
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Initial poverty 
(level)
-0.03***
(0.01)
-0.02***
(0.01)
Initial poverty 
(log)
-0.01
(0.01)
-0.002
(0.01)
Initial poverty gap 
(level)
-0.03***
(0.01)
Initial poverty gap 
(log)
0.001
(0.01)
Initial poverty gap 
squared (level)
-0.04***
(0.01)
Initial poverty gap 
squared (log)
-0.003
(0.01)
Growth rate of 
GDP per capita
-0.04
(0.07)
-0.06
(0.07)
-0.26
(0.30)
0.31
(0.31)
0.45
(1.19)
-0.10
(0.33)
0.03
(0.72)
0.02
(0.39)
Observations 29 18 29 18 18 18 18 18
R-squared 0.21 0.14 0.05 0.02 0.31 0.003 0.46 0.002
Source: World Bank staff calculations using the National Sample Survey Organization’s (NSSO) 55th and 61st round, http://mospi.nic.in/Mospi_New/site/Home.aspx.
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** represents significance at 1 percent, ** represents significance at 5 percent, * represents significance at 10 
percent. South Asia includes states in India (1994–2005), Pakistan (1999–2005), and Sri Lanka (1996–2002). Odisha is deleted from the sample for the India region. South Asia: 
Odisha, Tripura, and Northern have been removed. 
Table 2. Poverty Convergence in India and South Asia
Country
% of government 
revenue raised by 
subnational 
governments
% of government 
expenditure by 
subnational 
governments
Transfers to subna-
tional governmental 
units as a share of 
subnational revenues
India 33.6 52 39
Bangladesh < 2 3–4 64–70
Pakistan 7.3 30.3 81.1
Sri Lanka 7 12 82.5
World 21.7 29.1 32.5
China 59.7 81.5 35
Canada 52.2 59.7 21.3
United States 41.1 49.3 28.9
Mexico 23.5 23.1 47
Sources: India, Canada, Mexico, and world figures are from Government Finance Statistics (GFS 1999); U.S. 
and Mexico figures are from GFS 2006; world average is based on the 41 countries in the GFS database. 
Table 3. Extent of Fiscal Decentralization in South Asia and the World
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institutions. The largest component of fiscal transfers in India 
comes from the tax-sharing schemes, but the discretionary 
transfers and the subsidies put together are almost as large as 
the tax shares.
Achieving Equity through Fiscal Transfers
In most countries, fiscal transfers ensure equity across sub-
national regions. This equity is important for economic and 
political reasons. Poorer regions have a lower base of eco-
nomic activity to tax, and typically these regions spend con-
siderably less on social services, including education and 
health care. Figure 3 shows social spending per capita across 
states of India.
Achieving horizontal equity through fiscal transfers can 
ensure a level playing field. This equity can be particularly im-
portant if the government services are important inputs into 
future growth potential, such as in developing a healthy and 
educated workforce. Growing regional disparities can cause 
political tensions, and fiscal transfers can offset some of these 
disparities. 
Does the system of fiscal decentralization in India trans-
fer more revenue to poorer regions? When looking at the dif-
ferent components of fiscal transfers in India, it is clear that 
horizontal equity is being achieved only through the tax-shar-
ing schemes of the Finance Commission (figure 4a). The state 
plan grants administered by the Planning Commission do not 
seem to be directed toward the poorer states (figure 4b), 
whereas the discretionary schemes show higher per capita ex-
penditures in the richer states (figure 4c). 
Food subsidies per capita are roughly uniform across 
poor and rich states, that is, if it is assumed that all subsidies 
are used for the sale of food by the Food Corporation of India 
(figure 4d). Conversely, if one allocates food subsidies on the 
assumption that all the subsidies are spent in food procure-
ment at above-market prices, then the highest levels of subsi-
dies are given to the leading states of Punjab, Haryana, and 
Maharashtra (figure 4e). The true picture is probably a mix 
of production and consumption subsidies, but the conclu-
sion is that these food subsidies are not significantly higher 
in poorer regions. The second-largest source of subsidies, fer-
tilizer, benefits richer regions much more than poorer re-
gions, because the richer regions tend to consume more fer-
tilizer (figure 4f). If the subsidies are meant to improve 
welfare programs and investment levels in lagging regions, 
they need to be targeted to those regions, rather than to a 
specific good or service that may be consumed more heavily 
in richer states.
In Pakistan and Sri Lanka, poorer regions are obtaining a 
higher level of per capita fiscal transfers. In Sri Lanka, the 
highest levels of per capita funding have been allocated to the 
North-East Province, the center of a long-running Tamil sepa-
ratist movement. In this sense, fiscal transfers appear to ad-
dress a political problem as well. In Bangladesh, however, no 
explicit mandates direct resource transfers toward poorer re-
gions. The World Bank’s recent Public Expenditure Report 
on Bangladesh raised the concern that poorer regions are be-
ing allocated lower levels of per capita development funding 
(World Bank 2009a). 
Helping Lagging Regions
The focus on shared prosperity does not necessarily imply re-
ducing inequality, but rather emphasizes the need for a social, 
economic, and institutional arrangement that maximizes the 
incomes of the less well off. Moreover, policies and programs 
that are consistent with these objectives have to be fiscally sus-
tainable. The right policies for a country are those that are 
part of a detailed social contract that aims to end poverty per-
manently, along an intertemporally balanced growth path and 
in an environmentally sustainable fashion. 
The well-being of lagging and poorer states is constrained 
by the total availability of resources. One way of overcoming 
the resources problem would be to divert resources from ex-
isting subsidy-oriented programs toward safety nets, educa-
tion, health, and infrastructure. Another is to accelerate the 
privatization of central public sector enterprises (PSEs) and 
earmark the proceeds from these sales specifically to the de-
velopment of much needed economic and social infrastruc-
ture in the lagging regions. This would be a much more effec-
tive way of helping the poorer states than the traditional 
approach of pushing existing PSEs to make commercial in-
vestments in the less developed states. Such initiatives have 
done little in the past for the economic development of the 
area and have often increased the probability of driving the 
PSEs into sickness. On the other hand, privatizing existing 
central PSEs, and using the proceeds to build social and eco-
nomic infrastructure in the backward states will increase the 
efficiency with which existing PSE assets are used, while si-
multaneously helping to improve the efficiency of resource 
use in the poorer states and hopefully leveraging a greater flow 
of private investment. 
Figure 3. Social Service Expenditures across Indian States, 2006–7
Source: Ministry of Finance 2008, 2009.
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Figure 4. Different Types of Fiscal Transfers to Lagging Regions in India, 2005–6
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or requiring the states to share a proportion of the cost (centrally sponsored schemes). These are wholly discretionary and often are not coordinated with Planning Commission 
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Conclusion
The current patterns of economic growth are not sufficient to 
enable the lagging regions of South Asia to catch up with the 
leading regions in terms of proportional poverty reduction. 
Given that South Asia has the world’s largest number of peo-
ple living below the poverty line, and that the majority of the 
poor are in lagging regions, policies must be specifically tar-
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geted toward achieving greater growth and poverty reduction 
in these regions. 
One particular policy measure to achieve shared prosper-
ity is pro-poor fiscal transfers. The performance of South 
Asian countries in achieving horizontal equity through fiscal 
transfers is mixed. For the most part, the systems of interstate 
fiscal transfers in South Asian countries do transfer a greater 
amount of resources to poorer regions, suggesting that they 
are working to achieve greater equity. However, this outcome 
usually occurs when interstate fiscal transfers are transparent 
and have explicit rules, and this is not always the case. 
Further, simply directing financial resources to lagging 
regions may not be sufficient and may need to be comple-
mented with increases in capacity, accountability, and partici-
pation at the local level, so that poor regions can make full use 
of these resources. 
Fiscal decentralization and other resource transfer poli-
cies can be complementary to policies that directly aim to ac-
celerate the growth rate in lagging regions. This can be done 
by improving the business environment for the private sector, 
supporting market integration, improving connectivity, and 
ensuring macroeconomic stability. The government can also 
intervene directly in sectors or locations in which the private 
sector is reluctant to invest. 
Policy makers need to boost shared prosperity and take 
another look at the Millennium Development Goal para-
digm. A new lens is needed—one that shifts the focus of policy 
from national to subnational level, and from leading to lag-
ging regions, where poverty, gender disparity, and human 
misery are concentrated. 
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Note
1. These figures are for the 12th Finance Commission. The 
13th Finance Commission (Ministry of Finance 2009), 
whose recommendations apply from 2010–15, assigned 
weights as follows: state area, 10 percent; population, 25 per-
cent; fiscal discipline, 17.5 percent (measured as the improve-
ment in the ratio of the state’s own revenue to total expendi-
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estimated per capita revenue and the per capita revenue of 
Haryana, the second highest state in terms of revenue per 
capita).
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